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Lingbloom 1
The storied survival of Switzerland in the face of fascism during the Second 
World War has long been an inspiring topic to historians. But with the reemergence of 
issues surrounding Swiss banking and economic practices during the war, the question of 
how a nation with an overwhelming ethnic German population surrounded by the Axis 
Powers could maintain its independence has become highly contentious. Oftentimes the 
most simplistic of explanations are offered to explain this paradox, but these analyses are 
very one-sided and tend to overlook the broad scope of strategy employed by the Swiss to 
guarantee their continued autonomy. The true reasons for Germany’s failure to invade 
Switzerland are complex and entail aspects of political and racial ideology, military 
defense, foreign trade and economic self-reliance. The Swiss were aware of the German 
threat and took, meticulously, necessary steps in all of these arenas to minimize the threat 
of invasion. They did so in the ways that best fitted the national ideology of neutrality 
and the discouraging realities they faced.
In order to dispel the basic generalizations made about Switzerland during the 
Second World War, it is essential to establish what those misconceptions are. The first is 
the belief that Switzerland survived the war because of a firm national resolve and a 
powerful plan of military defense. They were prepared to destroy their own 
infrastructure in order to make the fight as long and painful for the Germans as possible, 
while simultaneously draining off their forces in other parts of the continent. Although it 
is true that the Swiss plan of defense would very likely have achieved these goals, it is 
hard to believe that Hitler would have held back his armies out of fear. The military 
explanation is valid, but it is not strong enough to stand alone.
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The other predominant opinion is one that reemerged in the 1990’s, that the Swiss 
survival was due solely to collaboration with the Nazis. For a price, Swiss businessmen 
hid ill-gotten Nazi gold in their banks, actively traded with Germany, and took whatever 
steps available to profit from the war and help ensure success for the Axis with some 
level of cooperation from Berne. While these accusations certainly have a reasonable 
basis, they are hardly fair. The reality of the topic is far more complicated, and can not 
be watered down to such bold statements. A reasonable consideration of Swiss actions 
during the war requires an all encompassing analysis.
In recent years more documentation has been available to research the period, and 
in December of 1996, the Swiss Federal Council and Parliament commissioned a group 
of experts to investigate the perspectives, opinions and claims, both positive and 
negative, surrounding Switzerland’s war time role. The Independent Committee of 
Experts Switzerland- Second World War, or ICE, spent the next six years researching the 
vast amount of material available, and accomplished research that one or two 
independent historians would be hard pressed to accomplish in a lifetime. After many 
preliminary reports and publications, the final report of the ICE was published in 2002, 
and is now the paramount work on the subject. In the conclusion of the report, the ICE 
describes their historical approach:
The analytical perspective which we have developed differs from the 
cliches which portrayed Switzerland, on the one hand, as a small, neutral 
country which from 1940 onwards was completely encircled by the Axis 
powers and only survived thanks to its power of resistance, and on the 
other as a country of bribable bankers whose only concern was to extract
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profit from the human and economic havoc engendered by the war 
surrounding the country. ’
The cliches to which the ICE referred dominate the available historical material, 
and even the most thoughtful and well written books carry a clear bias. The passion with 
which these works have been written shows the tensions surrounding many of the issues 
at hand.
Before delving further into the topics of Switzerland’s specific war time actions, 
however, it is important to examine briefly the practice of neutrality, specifically how 
that policy has been manifested in Switzerland. Since the Napoleonic era, when 
Switzerland was last used as a battleground, the Swiss have abided strictly by the concept 
of armed neutrality, and, for the most part, did so before Napoleon as well. Switzerland 
would not only avoid taking sides in any conflict that took place around them, but they 
signaled their intent to fiercely protect their own sovereignty through military means.
This idea sunk in during the First World War, when the clash between Germany 
and France involved the invasion of Belgium. Swiss troops sat at the border, especially 
at the point where the German and French lines met close to Switzerland. The war ended 
largely without incident for the Swiss; there had been very little motive for either 
belligerent to invade the country. The war had been entirely political as opposed to 
ideological; a contest between European powers to see who was on top.
The real threat to Swiss independence came in the 1930’s with the rise of the Nazi 
regime in Germany. While the Nazis wanted political dominance just as badly as the old 
school of politicians had wanted it at the turn of the century, the ideology behind their
' Independent Committee of Experts Switzerland - Second World War, Switzerland. National Socialism 
and the Second World War (Zurich: Pendo, 2002) (hereafter ICE), 494-495.
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actions was what became suspicious and threatening to Germany’s neighbors. Among 
the many racially frightening aspects of Nazi ideology to the Swiss was Hitler’s drive for 
the unification of all German people. The ethnically motivated policies of the Nazi 
regime led to the Anschluss with Austria in 1938, and understandably increased 
apprehension from the Swiss, whose borders adjoined both Austria and Germany. 
German propaganda subsequently increased its insistence on the topic, as a Frankfurt 
newspaper proclaimed that “no branch of the German race has the right or the possibility 
of withdrawing from the common destiny of all the Germans.” Statements such as these 
reflected the sentiment of the highest Nazis; they required the approval of Josef 
Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propoganda.^
The Swiss response to these actions was anything but positive. Switzerland was a 
country that ideologically defined itself as a politische Willensnation, meaning “a nation 
shaped by the political will of its citizens.”^ For centuries the Swiss had not defined 
themselves by race or language, but by a mix of religions, races and languages that in and 
of itself had grown into a distinct culture. Of course the marriage of German Reformed 
Protestantism and French Catholicism was not always an easy one. Napoleon had played 
off these differences to his advantage in the early nineteenth century, but political intrigue 
through the infusion of doctrine was not likely to be an effective means of subversion for 
the Nazis in Switzerland. The Swiss were simply too unified and vigilant to let it happen.
Action readily accepted by the population was taken by the Swiss government to 
stem the influence of National Socialism. Distinct factions of the Swiss government had 
been moving apart in their convictions in recent years, but the new threat of German




ethno-irredentism started to reunify the Swiss. In the spring of 1938, the Swiss 
Parliament, apart from two communists and the one fascist, declared the following:
All the political groups of the two houses approve the declaration of the 
Federal Council. They solemnly affirm that the entire Swiss people - 
without regard to tongue, confession or party - are prepared to defend the 
inviolability of their territory against any aggressor to the last drop of 
blood. ^
The media also played a key role in revealing the political sentiments and 
tendencies of the Swiss on the eve of war. Moderate censorship of the media was 
accepted by the press with little fuss, and many media outlets were faithful in censoring 
themselves. This was not solely a noble act of patriotism on the part of media 
corporations; it was a calculated response to pre-existing attitudes. Suppression of Nazi 
sympathy was not only good for the cohesion of the nation, it was good for business.^
After the war started, some clashes between the government and the press 
naturally took place, but no heavy restrictions were ever laid down. The vast majority of 
the press had been and continued to be heavily slanted towards the Allies, much to the 
annoyance of the Third Reich. Despite repeated complaints from the Axis, the Swiss 
press remained mostly free, respecting the federal request for moderation throughout the 
conflict.^
Politically, Switzerland insisted on being non-preferential for the duration of the 
war. Regardless of German ethnicity or democratic ideology, the Swiss government 
maintained neutrality as the focal point of foreign policy and relationships with
^ Halbrook, 50.
^ ICE, 78.
^ Urs Schwarz, The Eve of the Hurricane: Switzerland in World War Two (Boulder, Westview, 1980), 120- 
122.
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belligerent nations. Though the Swiss in general were more ideologically sympathetic to 
the Allied cause, they were forced to tread lightly in the shadow of German imperialism.
The area of Swiss national policy requiring the most change to face the threat of 
war was, for obvious reasons, the military. The racial ideology of Germany, combined 
with the aggressiveness it had displayed towards its neighboring nations, showed clearly 
that it was the biggest military threat to Switzerland. Thus, when in 1939 full scale war 
broke out in Europe, the Federal assembly named Henri Guisan commanding general of 
the Swiss military. In times of peace, there was no supreme general to command the 
Swiss armed forces; one was named only when facing a distinct threat or in case of army 
mobilization. Both were the case in 1939.
The significance of Henri Guisan’s nomination rested mostly in his ethnicity. The 
Swiss military leadership had traditionally been German, but Guisan was French-Swiss, 
bom, raised and educated in the Canton of Vaud.^ This is not to say, however, that 
Guisan was a supporter of France itself over Germany. The truth is that, in the years 
before the war, Guisan, like many French military officers, felt much more threatened by 
communist rumblings in France than by the Nazi movement in Germany.* Guisan’s 
selection as a political statement was due more to his ethnicity than his actual political 
beliefs.
Regardless of where Guisan stood in the mid 1930’s, it was very clear to him and 
the rest of Switzerland that Germany presented the greatest potential threat to Swiss 
autonomy. Consequently, the first plan of defense adapted by the military was one based 
solely on the notion that Gemany would be the invading nation, not France.
^ Willi Gautschi, General Henri Guisan: Commander-In-Chief of the Swiss Army in World War II. trans.
Karl Vonlanthen, (Rockville Centre, Front Street, 2003), 1.
* ICE, 80.
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Additionally, the plan assumed that Germany and France would be at war, and that a 
front could be established in Switzerland as an extension of French defenses.
This plan, known as the Limmat Line, or Limmatstellung, was a defensive chain 
that stretched from Fortress Sargans and the former Austrian border in the east to Basel 
and the Rhine River in the north, near the beginning of the French Maginot Line. The 
boundary included Lake Zurich and the Limmat River and was heavily fortified. General 
Guisan even made preparations for joint French and Swiss resistance, but only if called 
for by Swiss leaders.’
The French were more than happy to cooperate in the event of an invasion. 
Germany had stormed through the neutral nation of Belgium in the First World War in 
order to catch the French on their heels; there was no doubt that this method could be 
tried again, and Germany could possibly use the Swiss lowlands in the same manner to 
swing around the French lines. By defending Switzerland, France would in fact be 
working to defend herself The Swiss military felt prepared for the war, and when the 
Scandinavian kingdoms of Denmark and Norway were invaded in April of 1940, the 
government expressed to military personnel their duty to defend Switzerland whether on 
active duty or not.*®
The conclusion of Germany’s 1940 campaign, however, forced the Swiss to 
rethink their strategy for survival. The Blitzkrieg and subsequent defeat of France left 
Switzerland surrounded by the Axis- Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and the puppet state of
’ Jiirg Stiissi-Lauterburg, “The Threat of Three Totalitarianisms; The Swiss Response,” in Switzerland 




Vichy France. No longer could the Swiss depend on an Allied country to come to the 
rescue in case of a German or Italian invasion.
The new developments in Europe’s political balance meant the necessity of a new 
defensive strategy in Switzerland. It was well known by the Swiss intelligence service 
that the Reich had plans to invade, so the task facing the Swiss government was to make 
that option as unappealing as possible to the German High Command and to Hitler. This 
meant an overall national strategy that included distinct plans for the military and the 
economy, with elements of both self-sustainability and international cooperation.
The task of the military was the most straightforward, once several key facts were 
understood and accepted by Guisan and his staff Most importantly, it had become 
increasingly obvious that if Germany chose to invade, the Swiss would not be able to stop 
them at the borders. All the army could hope to do was slow the advance of German 
troops as much as possible. This meant the abandonment of the Limmatstellung and the 
development of an entirely new defensive scheme.
On July 25, 1940, General Guisan held a meeting for all of his unit commanders 
at the historic site of Riitli meadow, on Lake Lucerne. It was at this site that the Swiss 
Confederation was formed by the first three Cantons in 1291. Here, following the fall of 
France, Guisan entreated his men to fight for Switzerland to the end, resisting any 
invading force no matter what the cost.' * The plan that developed from this notion of 
unconditional resistance was that of the national redoubt, or reduit.
A reduit is an inner layer of a fortress, used to make the stronghold more 
forbidding overall. Using a highly defensible chain of fortresses and natural barriers, the
’ ’ Gautschi, 518-a.
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Swiss created a military belt around the heart of the country.’^ The plan was to retreat to 
the confines of the reduit immediately following an invasion, where the Swiss military 
and government would then hold out as long as possible.
The Swiss reduit maintained the same mountainous borders in the south, but left 
the Cantons of Ticino and Grabunden largely undefended. In reality, the Swiss did not 
fear an Italian invasion nearly as much as a German attack. In part this was due to the 
geographical conditions; much of the Italian border was simply impassible. Furthermore, 
the Italian army was not to be nearly as feared or respected as their German counterparts. 
They had failed to invade France successfully even as German soldiers entered Paris, so 
the Swiss firmly believed they could repulse any attempt by Mussolini. Switzerland’s 
northern Alps formed the other side of the reduit, however, leaving the lowlands of 
northern Switzerland relatively exposed.
This primary strategy of this defensive scheme was not found it its ability to win a 
war with Germany, but served two other very important purposes. If Switzerland were 
invaded, the r^uit would hopefully provide a means by which the army and government 
could hold out for months or even years, hopefully long enough for the Allies to win the 
war and break the siege. Most of all, the overall plan was meant to discourage an attack 
from ever taking place. By convincing Hitler that the invasion would be too long and 
costly, the Swiss could prevent war from ever entering the country.
For this very reason the plan in its strategic aspects was not kept secret. Knowing 
that the chief purpose of an invasion would be to directly link Germany and Italy,
Edgar Bonjour, “Severely Tested: Swiss Neutrality During Two World Wars,” in Switzerland Under 
Siege 1939-1945: A Neutral Nation’s Struggle for Survival, ed. Leo Schelbert (Roclqjort: Pickton, 2000), 
124.
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Guisan’s plan was to deny just that.’^ In this sense, the defensive plan had a direct 
impact on the economic sector. Critical railroad lines passed through Switzerland 
connecting the Axis nations, crossing over (or through) key passes, including Sargans, St. 
Maurice and St. Gotthard. Fortresses were constructed at each of these locations, to be 
defended to the last. In addition, bridges and tunnels across the country were prepared 
for demolition in case of a German attack.
These three primary fortresses were not a single fort as one might imagine, but a 
series of tunnels, bunkers and fortifications stretching over 100 square miles of rough 
mountains. The only valley entrances, as in the case of the Sargans fortress near the 
Austrian border, were completely covered by heavy cannon concealed in the mountains. 
Panzers would not be able to threaten the reduit, mostly because of terrain, and the 
effectiveness of air strikes would be minimal, since most forts were built directly into 
cliffs and mountains and reinforced by concrete and steel.
It is pertinent before analyzing the decisions made by the Swiss in defending their 
country from the Germans to examine the military tradition of the nation. Militarily, the 
Swiss have a legacy covering centuries. Any European power that understood the 
military history of the continent did not take the Swiss lightly. For hundreds of years the 
men of Switzerland had served in crack military units for hire, renowned for unwavering 
ferocity and loyalty, a fine compliment to any nation’s forces.
The military system put in place by the Swiss created as formidable a force as 
could be expected from the small nation on the eve of the Second World War. The idea 




ready to answer the call of duty at a moment’s notice, seemed almost natural for the 
Swiss way of life. In addition to the ferocious maintenance of freedom from her 
neighbors, the Swiss citizen seemed almost the perfect model for a soldier. One of the 
reasons for this is the emphasis placed on marksmanship in the social context of Swiss 
life.
Hugh Wilson, the American Ambassador to Switzerland for ten years in the 
nineteen twenties and thirties, commented: “The Swiss citizen retains his uniform and 
rifle at home, ready for instant mobilization; and he spends many of his Sundays 
qualifying for marksmanship awards with his friends in his community as men of other 
nationalities spend their leisure at golf, fishing or other recreation.”’^
Shooting was essentially the national sport of Switzerland, with a standard 
distance of 300 meters, very far indeed, used for competition. Swiss soldiers were 
trained at shooting from distances of 50 to 300 meters, and practiced even outside of 
training. In contrast, German soldiers were only trained to shoot within a range of 100 
meters.’^ If the two nations were to meet in partisan type fighting among the Alps, the 
Swiss would have a distinct advantage in this capacity. Accordingly, that is exactly what 
Guisan had in store with his plan for a reduit.
Of course it would be impractical to assume that Hitler went so far as to analyze 
details such as these when making his decisions on Switzerland, but the point is still 
made. The Swiss were a people whom many respected for their soldiering capabilities. 
In addition, it was important for the superpowers of the time to learn from the Soviet 
debacle that was the Winter War of 1939-40. Even by conservative estimates over half a
’’ Ibid, 27.
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niillion Soviet soldiers were killed by the badly outnumbered Finns. The Red Army lost 
twenty men for every one Finn. Two things marked this war: the marksmanship and 
soldiering abilities of the Finnish troops and the effect of climate and terrain on Stalin’s 
ability to run a successful campaign.
However, the well-trained German military could not be equated to the inefficient 
^cd Army. The Swiss would have had the advantage of mountainous terrain not 
available to the Finns, but would also be facing a much more formidable opponent than 
the Soviet Union. At any rate, the point is not that the same thing would have happened 
to Germany had Switzerland been invaded, but that there was a possibility of something 
similar happening. The German military could not ignore the lessons stemming from the 
Winter War simply because they were in better condition than the Russians.
Nevertheless, the Germans did have a plan for the invasion of Switzerland, in 
oonjunction with the Italians. On June 17, 1940, one week after the French government 
had fled Paris, Hitler initiated a plan for total encirclement of Switzerland. The plan was 
to completely cut them off from the outside world, or at least secure the ability to do so at 
a moment’s notice. On the same day. The Italian and German ambassadors to 
Switzerland met to discuss how the nation would be divided between the two 
belligerents.*^ Operation Tannenbaum, a plan for the actual invasion of the country, was 
developed in secret.
The encirclement was unsuccessful, partially because of the failure to secure the 
last railway link to the outside world. The railway from Geneva to the French city of 
A^nnecy remained inside the control of Vichy France, much to the fhistration of the
Klaus Umer, “Let’s Swallow Switzerland”: Hitler’s Plans against the Swiss Confederation, trans. Lotti 
Eichhorn (Lanham: Lexington, 2002), 25-27.
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Fiihrer. Furthermore, the Italians were unable to secure the Savoy region, which 
encompassed the south shore of Lac Leman to the Mediterranean Sea and the Italian 
border. Because the Italians did not conduct a successful campaign against the French in 
the mountains of the region, Vichy France would not accept defeat by their hands. 
Consequently, Switzerland failed to be completely isolated.’* Unfortunately for 
Germany, the order to secure all French territory bordering Switzerland was received just 
fifteen minutes after an armistice was signed with the Vichy government.'^
The most critical time for the Swiss during the course of the war was Ifom May 
1940, when the invasion of France commenced, to June 1941, the start of Operation 
Barbarossa, the attack on the Soviet Union. Germany was unlikely to divert forces to a 
full scale invasion of Switzerland before France had been dealt with, except perhaps 
briefly as a conduit around the French lines. Subsequently, the chance of Hitler sending 
his precious divisions to Switzerland after the invasion of the Soviet Union had begun, or 
even as preparations were for the attack were being made, was much smaller. Even after 
the occupation of Vichy France in 1942, effectively surrounding Switzerland, the time of 
greatest threat was over. Hitler needed every soldier available to maintain a two front 
war; an invasion of Switzerland would have been a severe strategic error.
This is of course assuming that Switzerland met some minimum economic 
requirements of the Axis powers. In some ways Germany especially was dependent on 
Switzerland for reasons of trade, and therefore the Swiss took economic measures to 
ensure their independence, complementing those steps taken militarily. The first and 




previous policy. Switzerland was placed very strategically to be successful in European 
trade, and so the use of the north-south railway lines by other countries was encouraged 
as part of its own development. With the onset of the Second World War, and the 
increased threat of fascism, it only made sense to continue these policies.
For example, the railway lines linking Germany and Italy through Switzerland 
were essential to the Axis war plan. Of the four main railroad links connecting the Axis 
powers, the two more direct routes went through the heart of Switzerland. As long as 
Switzerland allowed the free flow of goods through its borders, they were more likely to 
be left alone, with the unlikely possibility of interference from the Allies through 
sabotage or air raids.^® If, on the other hand, the Swiss decided to close their borders and 
cut off trade through these railway links, the Axis would have been backed into a comer. 
One thing is for certain: the railroad links Switzerland maintained became one of the key 
bargaining chips for the duration of the war. Consequently, they were treated as one of 
the country’s greatest assets. The railroads were heavily protected by the Swiss military, 
while simultaneously prepared for demolition in case of an invasion by the Axis.^'
The statistics of north-south transit through Switzerland are quite revealing on this 
matter. Fifteen to twenty thousand tons of freight passed through the country on these 
lines each month before the summer of 1940. By 1941 this number had jumped to 
30,000, and then doubled to 60,000 by the spring of 1944. The steep rise in tonnage was 
coupled by a shift from consumer goods towards raw materials, such as metals and 
chemicals. In addition, a rise in illegal transit developed in the latter part of the war. 




could be of economic use in the continuing war effort. Machine parts and scrap metal 
taken from Italian factories, and even stolen food, were taken by the Germans and sent 
north despite grossly violating international law.^^ This led to increased pressure on the 
already strained relations of Switzerland and the Allied powers, and Swiss customs 
eventually cracked down on the illegal activity and did its part in preventing the Italian 
infrastructure from being completely and unapologetically dismantled.^^
Switzerland had motivation to maintain good economic relations with Germany 
for other reasons as well. At the end of the First World War a general strike crippled the 
Swiss economy. The strike had been triggered by massive unemployment during the 
war, which had in turn been caused by abnormal trade relations with the belligerent 
nations. Because Switzerland’s industry was dependent on the import of many raw 
materials, a decline in trade foretold a rise in unemployment. To prevent a similar fate 
during World War Two, a continuation of normal trade relations with nations on both 
sides became the top economic priority of the Swiss.^^
The issue of food for its citizens was also an issue that weighed heavily on the 
Swiss government. The nation was dependent on imports to feed its population, and 
therefore must be sure that it could continue to provide for its people. A system of 
rationing was put into place, but the key to survival was to develop sustainability for all 
of Switzerland’s food production. If the Swiss could develop a completely independent




Heinz K. Meier, Between Hammer and Anvil: Neutrality and the Necessities of Trade,” in Switzerland 
Under Siege 1939-1945: A Neutral Nation’s Struggle for Survival, ed. Leo Schelbert (Rockport: Pickton, 
2000), 13L “ -------------------
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A strategy was developed by a committee of scientists charged with improving 
the situation, known as the Wahlen Plan. The plan called for a massive increase in 
acreage for growing potatoes, vegetables, and wheat. At the same time, the amount of 
livestock in Switzerland was greatly reduced. As former Swiss soldier Urs Schwarz 
reported, “Football fields, parks, roadsides, railroad embankments, and the lawn in the 
smallest garden soon became covered with potato blossoms, bean sticks, and tomato 
plants and after working hours would swarm with men, women, and children feeling they 
were doing patriotic work.”^^
The Wahlen plan served several purposes. Perhaps most importantly, it made up 
for a lack of supplies normally provided by the Western powers. However, though this 
was a benefit of the plan, it was not its original intent. The goal of the Wahlen plan was 
to serve more as a defensive step against the Axis then as a reaction to a lack of imports. 
In the case of being completely encircled by the Axis, there may have been an attempt to 
lay siege to Switzerland by cutting off supplies. The plan would help to combat any such 
attempt through agricultural sustainability. By 1943, the acreage of cultivatable land was 
doubled in size.^^
The most controversial economic policies of the Swiss, however, surrounded 
Swiss banks and foreign exchange. Because the value of the German Mark faced 
devastation by the war, it was important for the Nazi government to back their holdings 
with the currency of a more stable country; a neutral country. For reasons of proximity 
Switzerland was one of the most obvious choices for this process. Furthermore, due to 




was able to sell gold that was acquired through less than honorable means. This gold, 
and its transaction from Germany to Switzerland during the war, presents perhaps the 
most difficult issue of Switzerland’s war time actions to address.
Some simple facts reveal why this issue is so contentious. 1,231.1 million francs 
worth of gold was sold by the Reichsbank to the Swiss National Bank between 1940 and 
1945, and 101.2 million more was sold to commercial Swiss banks. When the 
Reichsbank shipped gold abroad, over three-quarters of the gold was arranged through 
Switzerland. The political and legal implications of this relationship, not to mention 
ethical issues, became a main source of discussion as to Switzerland’s wartime role.^^
The Swiss government sought to increase the amount of gold within the country 
to back the printing of the Swiss Franc. One very effective way of doing so was through 
the purchase of gold from various nations involved in the war to provide a dual service. 
The belligerent nations would have access to Swiss currency, and the Swiss National 
Bank would have more gold to back that currency, thereby strengthening it.^*
The issue here is not one of favoritism, but of judgment. During the course of the 
war Switzerland actually purchased more gold from the Allied countries than from the 
Axis. From the United States alone Switzerland purchased 2,242.9 million Francs worth, 
vastly more than it bought from all of the Axis nations combined.^^ The discretion that 
Switzerland used in its transactions with Germany is what has become the subject of 
scrutiny. It was no secret where the gold was coming from, and consequently the Swiss 





“business as usual” were unsuccessful, and consequently they are seen as one 
Switzerland’s greatest wartime faults.^®
In stark contrast to some of the more controversial economic policies of 
Switzerland, which in the extreme painted the Swiss as war profiteers and Nazi 
collaborators, stood the services provided to victims of the war. As a neutral nation, 
Switzerland was able to help in ways that would have not been available had they gotten 
involved in the fighting. For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
based in Geneva, was able to help wounded soldiers and helped to process letters from 
prisoners. Additionally, it sought to reunite wounded soldiers and families, using an 
immense registration system.
Because of Switzerland’s location, refugees were an important issue of national 
policy. It is estimated that about 300,000 total refugees, military and civilian, were 
admitted to Switzerland during the war, an impressive number considering that the 
population of the country was less than 5 million.^’ Jewish refugees were at one point cut 
off by decree of the federal police chief, Heinrich Rothmund. The resulting public outcry 
was so powerful that the policy was almost immediately overturned, and Jewish children, 
families, and elderly were allowed to enter.^^ The sentiment of the Swiss people is more 
revealing than the failed policy; a general impression of Swiss sympathies is provided by 
instances such as these.
Ibid, 227. The issue of gold transactions during World War II, especially involving Swizerland, is an 
extremely complicated matter. In addition, the questionable actions of Swiss banks after the war in dealing 
with money stolen from and deposited by victims of the Holocaust is not something addressed by this 
paper. It is a very important topic, but the analysis of this paper is limited to Swiss actions during and 




Switzerland also served as a political go-between for nations at war, a “protecting 
power.” Urs Schwarz describes the role as follows: “Each government therefore requests 
a nation not at war with their opponents to assume the mission of the protecting power, 
and entrusts its diplomats with the defense of certain interests on the enemy’s territory.” 
Switzerland at one point assumed the challenging task of fulfilling this role for 219 
diplomatic relationships, including protecting power for Germany in the United States 
and vice versa.Switzerland served in this capacity to limit the destruction of the war as 
much as possible, through actions such as the negotiation of the exchange of prisoners.
It is true that frequently refugees were turned away from the Swiss border; many 
who came across did so by cover of night, illegally, and simply were not forced to leave. 
It is relevant, however, to examine the refugee policies of other nations during this time. 
The government of the United States, from which many of Switzerland’s sharpest 
postwar critics hailed, followed more stringent immigration policies than its Swiss 
counterpart. By 1941 it was virtually impossible for citizens or relatives of citizens from 
the Reich to enter the United States. From 1938 to 1942 less than half of the visas made 
available by the State Department were actually issued, despite desperate attempts to seek 
refuge within the country.
This comparison is not provided to excuse Switzerland’s policies, which at some 
points inhibited or prevented the admittance of many people, including Jews. Rather, it is 
an example of how nations responded to related problems such as national security and 
domestic supplies, both difficult matters for the Swiss. Perhaps the Swiss are to be 




The popular sentiment in the Allied nations was that the forces of democracy in 
the world needed to stand together against the tyranny and oppression that constituted 
fascism. In this sense, many regarded Switzerland as a traitor to her own beliefs and to 
her fellow nations that shared those beliefs. Indeed, it is not difficult to see why the 
citizens of the Allied countries felt this way. Switzerland, which long stood for freedom 
and democracy, was seen as shying away in the face of an enemy, abandoning her 
desperate ideologues in their time of greatest need.
The frustration of the Allied nations is understandable, but historically is an 
unwarranted case. For over a hundred years Switzerland’s principles had stood not just 
for freedom, but for neutrality. Since the ill effects of the Napoleonic Wars, Switzerland 
had managed to stay out of all European wars- despite the unification of its northern and 
southern neighbors in the late nineteenth century and the implosion of its eastern 
neighbor in the First World War. After being completely surrounded by war for years in 
that conflict, and seeing the pain and destruction caused by it, the Swiss could not help 
but recognize how fortunate they had been to evade it.
Ideology, rather than being motivation to join the war, was the very reason 
Switzerland sought to do everything possible to maintain its autonomy. The precedent 
had long been set; the Swiss would do what they needed in order to guarantee freedom 
for themselves. They would also help those outside Switzerland, but only as a secondary 
priority. This had long been the Swiss way, and is not reprehensible, but demands 
respect. The Swiss did much in the course of the war to help others, and should be 
admired for their perseverance, not criticized for their focus on self-preservation. The 
ICE made a brilliant analysis of the situation:
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Switzerland’s neutrality policy had fostered the illusion that by radically 
restricting its foreign policy, not only could it remain outside the “game of 
powers,” but also remain aloft from the social and political developments 
of the day. The events of 1940 shattered conventional wisdom about 
Switzerland’s status in Europe and the world; suddenly, it found itself in a 
unique and extremely one-sided situation of dependency.^^
The Swiss were not accustomed to the level of scrutiny and international pressure 
applied to them in the Second World War. Their attempt to remain absolutely neutral 
proved to be extremely difficult, as the continuation of “normal,” non-preferential 
economic and political relationships was clearly more helpful to the Axis. Nevertheless, 
the accusation of war-profiteering against Switzerland as a whole is hardly fair. Some 
individuals obviously benefited from the increased demand for war supplies in Germany, 
and others Ifom the questionable trade of gold, but the Swiss economy may have been 
better off if there had been no war at all.^^ There is no clear evidence that Switzerland’s 
economy benefited from the war.
The people of Switzerland, from the rural families working under the Wahlen 
Plan to government officials determining policy for international trade and defense, did 
what they could to ensure the security of their nation during the war. Security meant 
more than simply preventing a German invasion of the country. Obviously this was a top 
priority in Berne, but many other issues were of great importance as well. The 
assurances that its citizens would be fed and its economy kept alive were among the top 
motivations for policy, and as such affected relationships with other nations.
Though historians have the gift of hindsight, the Swiss government caught up in a 




Switzerland and decide how much humanitarian action, economic withdrawal, or even 
military action was feasible, but that is not the aim of this study. Rather, it attempted to 
provide a context and an explanation of Berne’s wartime priorities. Switzerland’s 
response to the crisis of a second world war fought around it in Europe as a two pronged 
strategy of military resistance and economic appeasement provides that context.
Switzerland could not be expected to abandon its own interests for a cause, no 
matter how noble. The Swiss served a humanitarian role through the care of refugees and 
wounded soldiers. They practiced ignoble financial policies and cooperated 
economically with the Axis. Perhaps most importantly, they were prepared to defend 
their country to the last, a fact they made clear to every nation involved in the war. The 
general population of Switzerland, as well as their government, cannot be judged for their 
actions in the Second World War. Though it may be reasonable to point out the mistakes 
and errors in judgment made by political and economic leaders, it is not warranted to 
condemn the alpine nation for its role in the war.
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